JAT Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 2 – Barrett

admin

THE ROLE OF TAXES IN PROMOTING THE EXPERIENCE OF HOME FOR TENANTS

Abstract

Tenants and owner-occupiers experience housing differently both in terms of wealth and consumption. An owner-occupied property is typically a person’s primary investment as well as a shelter, whereas a tenant also enjoys a roof over their head but does not share increases in value of the property they occupy. Furthermore, an owner-occupier typically enjoys non- financial benefits, including a sense of continuity and order in events (ontological security). In contrast, due to relatively weak legal protections in Australia and New Zealand, tenants often face ontological insecurity. These different experiences matter because owner-occupation is a normal aspiration, and has traditionally been privileged by government policies in property- owning democracies. Yet more than one-third of Australians and New Zealanders do not own the housing they occupy. Seeking to equalise housing experiences between tenants and owners is therefore an appropriate goal for government. In this article, the term ‘synthetic owner- occupation’ is used to describe a practicable, equalised housing experience for tenants relative to owner-occupiers, but ‘home’ has similar import.
Taxes can neutralise to some extent the different wealth experiences of tenants and owner- occupiers but, because these measures tend to level the circumstances of the majority downwards, they are politically implausible. While taxes cannot be effective alone, they may also contribute to closing the gap in consumption experiences of owner-occupiers and tenants. This article investigates, in particular, how taxes can supplement regulation in promoting an experience of home for tenants.

DOWNLOAD THE ARTICLE

JAT Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 1 – Nethercott, Gonzaga and Esin

admin

COUNTRY – BY – COUNTRY REPORTING: A NEW DIMENSION IN TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE OBLIGATIONS IN AUSTRALIA
Abstract
The G20/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan (BEPS Action Plan) aims to combat tax evasion through an effort to improve tax transparency and enhance the exchange of information and co-operation between tax authorities, governments and global entities. As part of the BEPS Action Plan’s recommendations on transfer pricing documentation, country-by-country reporting (CbCR) requirements have been introduced in many countries, including Australia. This paper analyses the Australian CbCR legislation and the impact of compliance requirements on large multinational consolidated groups in Australia. The paper reflects on CbCR issues that include and transcend the taxation sphere, such as general business reporting and corporate governance, as well as the consequences of failing to comply with CbCR obligations. The discussion underlines the need for a cohesive global cooperative effort involving tax authorities and taxpayers. It also raises the need for reporting entities to make the necessary governance adjustments in order to comply with the CbCR obligations, which will support the objectives outlined in the BEPS Action Plan.

DOWNLOAD THE ARTICLE

JAT Volume 20, Issue 02, Article 3 – Marriott

admin

PURSUIT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME IN NEW ZEALAND

Abstract
This article examines Government funding and performance targets for three New Zealand agencies tasked with investigating different facets of white-collar crime. The agencies are: the tax authority, Inland Revenue; the Serious Fraud Office, which is responsible for investigation and prosecution of serious financial fraud; and the Financial Markets Authority, which is responsible for financial market regulation and enforcement of conduct.
The primary question asked in this study is: do we take white-collar crime seriously in New Zealand? Reference to funding provided to each agency, and selected performance measures, suggests not. Furthermore, when compared to other financial crime, such as benefit fraud, different patterns of funding are visible. The agencies responsible for protecting society from white-collar crime are poorly funded and key performance measures have been diluted in recent times. The issues raised are examined through the theoretical frames of deterrence theory and procedural justice.
It is well-established that white-collar criminals receive more lenient punishments for equivalent crimes. However, the results of this study suggest that they are further privileged as their crimes are less likely to be investigated and prosecuted. This is, at least in part, a result of limited resources available to the government agencies responsible for these tasks.

DOWNLOAD THE ARTICLE