Volume 18 Issue 1 – Jones, Passant, McLarern

DOUBTS ABOUT THE CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL RESIDENCY TEST FOR COMPANIES?

By David Jones, John Passant AND John McLaren

This article critically examines the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) interpretation of the second statutory test for company residence found in the definition of ‘resident’ in sub-section 6(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The statutory test consists of three components: first, if the company is incorporated in Australia then it is a resident; second, if the company is not incorporated in Australia but the company is carrying on a business in Australia and has its central management and control in Australia then it is a resident; and third, it is not incorporated in Australia but it is carrying on business in Australia and has its voting power controlled by shareholders who are resident in Australia then it is a resident of Australia for taxation purposes. The central management and control test contained in the public Taxation Ruling TR 2004/15 has been the subject of considerable conjecture and confusion for many years. The ruling states that the test of residency for a company not incorporated in Australia consists of two requirements: the company must be carrying on business in Australia and it must have its central management and control located in Australia. A company not incorporated in Australia and thus not satisfying the first test of residency must have its central management and control in Australia or have the majority of shareholders resident in Australia coupled with the carrying on of a business in Australia before it is held to be a resident. The contrary view is that the central management and control test on its own may be sufficient to deem a non-Australian incorporated company to be a resident for taxation purposes. It is contended that there is no need to demonstrate that the company is also carrying on a business in Australia. This article contends that the approach of the Commissioner of Taxation contained in TR 2004/14, is open to serious doubt.

DOWNLOAD THE FULL ARTICLE

Volume 18 Issue 1 – Dollery, Drew

IN WHOSE INTEREST? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES GOVERNMENT’S POST-AMALGAMATION RATE PATH FREEZE POLICY

By Brian Dollery AND Joseph Drew

As part of its controversial forced amalgamation program, the Baird Government announced that merged councils would fall under a rate path freeze for a period of four years. During that time, merged municipalities would face the same rate increases they would have experienced had they not been amalgamated. The NSW Government also requested the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) to offer recommendations on how the rate freeze policy should best be implemented and IPART released Freezing Existing Rate Paths for Newly Merged Councils in August 2016. This paper examines the rate freeze policy and the IPART report and demonstrates that they would impose serious efficiency, equity and financial sustainability problems on compulsorily consolidated councils.

DOWNLOAD THE FULL ARTICLE

Volume 17, Issue 2 – Wu, Brown & Brown

EVASION OF INTEREST WITHHOLDING TAX: EVIDENCE FROM TRADING VOLUMES IN AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT BONDS

By Yanghui (Maggie) Wu, Philip G Brown and Rob Brown

There is very little evidence on the evasion of interest withholding tax. We find such evidence by focussing on the 5 December 2009 abolition of interest withholding tax on foreign investors in Australian government bonds. Prior to this date, foreign investors had an incentive to evade the tax by selling bonds ‘just prior to’ ex-interest days and (possibly) reinvesting on or after the ex-interest day. This practice is referred to as ‘coupon washing’. To detect the presence of coupon washing, we analyse daily trading volumes in Australian government bonds between 1998 and 2013. We find clear evidence of coupon washing in the period before the abolition of the tax. Evidence of coupon washing is much weaker after the abolition. We also find that abnormally high volumes are concentrated in high-coupon bonds, which further supports our findings, because high coupons provide a greater incentive for coupon washing than low coupons.

DOWNLOAD THE FULL ARTICLE