PURSUIT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME IN NEW ZEALAND
Abstract
This article examines Government funding and performance targets for three New Zealand agencies tasked with investigating different facets of white-collar crime. The agencies are: the tax authority, Inland Revenue; the Serious Fraud Office, which is responsible for investigation and prosecution of serious financial fraud; and the Financial Markets Authority, which is responsible for financial market regulation and enforcement of conduct.
The primary question asked in this study is: do we take white-collar crime seriously in New Zealand? Reference to funding provided to each agency, and selected performance measures, suggests not. Furthermore, when compared to other financial crime, such as benefit fraud, different patterns of funding are visible. The agencies responsible for protecting society from white-collar crime are poorly funded and key performance measures have been diluted in recent times. The issues raised are examined through the theoretical frames of deterrence theory and procedural justice.
It is well-established that white-collar criminals receive more lenient punishments for equivalent crimes. However, the results of this study suggest that they are further privileged as their crimes are less likely to be investigated and prosecuted. This is, at least in part, a result of limited resources available to the government agencies responsible for these tasks.